This paper analyzes the structure and functions of suppliers' associations (kyoryokukai) in the automobile industry in Japan. The bilateral assembler-supplier relationship has received much attention recently as a source of Japanese industrial competitiveness. However, this paper argues that the hitherto neglected area of inter-supplier coordination in technology diffusion is at least as important as the bilateral assembler-supplier relationship in accounting for the overall performance of the Japanese automotive industry. On the basis of company visits and a large-scale survey of first-tier suppliers conducted by the author, the paper analyzes the reasons why suppliers' associations were established, why they continue to exist today, and their effects on economic performance.
Introduction
The Japanese economy is often described as a 'network economy', with some distinctions made between enterprise groups and networks (Imai 1994) , or between inter-market and vertical keiretsu (Gerlach 1992) . A decade ago, when Italian industrial districts were rediscovered as a source of innovation and local economic regeneration (Piore and Sabel 1984) , scholars looked for equivalents in Japan. The same principles underlying flexible specialisation were found to be operating in large decentralised multinational firms (Sabel 1989) as in an engineering district of Sakaki (Friedman 1988 ) (which incidentally is just one of the 549 industrial districts in Japan) (SMEA 1989, p.117) .
The suppliers' association (known generically as kyoryokukai ), the focus of this paper, is a highly relevant type of network in this context. Such associations exist at all eleven Japanese vehicle manufacturers except Honda. In addition, over 300 primary parts suppliers, many of which are members of vehicle manufacturers' associations, have their own associations of suppliers (Dodwell 1986 , as cited in Smitka 1991 . The suppliers' association is therefore an institution with a significant presence in the Japanese automotive industry.
Despite this, suppliers' associations, their origins and their raison d'etre have been relatively understudied in recent years because the main paradigm for analyzing the leading sector of the Japanese economy does not allow for a network-like analysis. Traditionally, the suppliers' association featured in scholarly inquiries among Japanese Marxist economists as a tangible institution for large firms (monopoly capital) to exercise unilateral control over their smaller subcontracting firms. More recently, however, the Marxist paradigm has been superseded by transaction cost economics and game theory which conceives transactions as decomposable into bilateral contracts (Grossman and Hart 1986, Williamson 1985) . In this framework, Japanese car industry has a competitive edge because the assembler has forged a long-term and recurrent relationship with each of its core suppliers. The stability of the assembler-supplier relationship enables the supplier to contribute to design and development, to make investments and to accumulate know-how which may be useful only to that relationship. Such 'relationship-specific skills' (Asanuma 1989 ) are a major source of superior performance. This analysis of the bilateral relationship has tended to underestimate the significance of horizontal coordination among suppliers. Inter-supplier rivalry is certainly promoted by some Japanese assemblers' practice of making public the ranking of their core suppliers according to performance (see Wada 1991, p.9 for Toyota). Relative ranking creates an incentive to engage in continuous improvement (Aoki 1988) . But this technique of managing the supply chain can be implemented without a suppliers' association.
The above paradigm may, in part, account for a view that the suppliers' association is a redundant institution whose existence has far surpassed its utility. Until the 1970s, most assemblers were engaged in disseminating technical and organisational practices such as total quality control (TQC), value analysis or engineering (VA.VE), and Just-in-Time (JIT). The suppliers' association was a convenient forum for providing technical assistance en masse, while minimizing the spill-over of benefits from such assistance to competing assemblers. There were, therefore, significant 'association-specific rents' as well as bilateral relationship-specific rents.
However, with slower and less assured growth in the 1970s and 1980s, more suppliers started to diversify their risk by trading with several assemblers. Assemblers began to undertake less topdown technical assistance as benefits from association activities could no longer be made exclusive to one assembler, and more technologically capable suppliers emerged over time. According to this view, suppliers' associations continue to exist out of inertia. They are more like social clubs, and do not contribute much to the overall efficiency of the Japanese automobile industry today.
A view which goes beyond asserting the declining utility of suppliers' associations is based on the Adam Smithian notion of businessmen's conspiracy against the public interest. This was most recently expressed during the US-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) discussions.
Here, the suppliers' association was cited, along with horizontal enterprise groups, as keiretsu, a group of firms like a cartel which exists to protect its monopoly profit by excluding outsiders.
According to this view, the suppliers' association constitutes an unfair trading barrier which ought to be dismantled. Such criticism led Nissan, in 1991, to merge its two associations (Takarakai and Hoshokai) into one (Nisshokai), to which non-Japanese suppliers are increasingly admitted. Also, most of the Japanese assemblers have endeavoured to make the criteria for becoming association members more explicit and transparent than in the past. But the Japanese government's response, and its official line spelt out in recent Economic White Papers (EPA 1990, p.196ff; EPA 1992, p.276ff) , have been in terms of the bilateral relationship paradigm only. They have thus far failed to investigate whether the suppliers' association itself has any significant economic impact or not.
From the above, it is clear that a study of suppliers' associations is needed in order to clarify how they function and what their effects are. This is in anticipation of an increased interest in suppliers' associations from the following angles. First, keiretsu critics would wish to know: are the associations indeed exclusionary with strict boundaries, and ought to be dismantled? Second, as more non-Japanese firms are admitted into suppliers' association in Japan, potential overseas suppliers would need to have a good understanding of what association membership entails. 1 Third, is the suppliers' association a method of managing suppliers which would work only in Japan (as Womack et al (1990) seem to imply)? Alternatively, is it an organisational form worthy of emulation by Japanese and non-Japanese assemblers located in North America 2 and Europe? 3 Or is it a historical anachronism which would eventually wither away with the globalization of the car industry?
The evidence presented in this paper does not support the prevailing views in the literature spelt out above. It is shown (a) that contrary to the bilateral contracting view, suppliers value mutual learning from other suppliers just as much as learning from their assembler-customer; (b) that the majority of first-tier suppliers do not consider suppliers' associations to be of less use now than in the past; and (c) that association members have lower pre-tax profitability than nonmembers, a piece of evidence which undermines the view of the association as a cartel-like entity.
The empirical analysis will be based on data collected by the author through (i) company visits and interviews of purchasing departments and suppliers' association offices of all Japanese assemblers and some first-tier suppliers in 1992 and 1993, and (ii) a large-scale survey of first-tier suppliers conducted by the author in July 1993. This paper is structured as follows. The first section provides an overview of the membership structure, growth and turnover. This is followed by a brief account of the historical development in Section 2. Section 3 examines the contemporary functions of the suppliers' association and their effects.
Suppliers' Association as a Japanese Business Network
Considerable variations exist from association to association in its characteristics. First, as shown in Table 1 Automotive suppliers may be broadly classified into three categories: parts suppliers, raw materials suppliers, and suppliers of equipment and tools. Most assemblers have an association exclusively for parts suppliers, while some assemblers have separate associations for different types of suppliers. This paper concentrates on the associations of parts suppliers as they are numerically the most significant. In general, association members take up a large proportion --around 80 or 90 per cent --of each assembler's expenditure on purchasing parts (see Table 2 ).
However, the degree to which the association is encompassing varies from assembler to assembler. Second, there are around 40 locally based sub-contractors which tend to be independent in shareholding and personnel aspects, but are heavily dependent on orders placed by Toyota (Ueda 1989, p.15-6 The trend towards overlapping membership was accompanied by an increase in the total number of members over time. Such increases were conspicuous at smaller manufacturers such as Mazda, Fuji and Isuzu, which tried to tap into the more competitive supplier network of Toyota and Nissan.
Small changes in the total number of association members, of course, do not preclude high turnover, with new entrants replacing those that exit (see Table 4 ). In the 1970s, Nissan's associations had the lowest turnover, but by the 1980s, Toyota's association emerged as the one with the lowest rates of quits and entry. At Toyota, the Tokai Kyohokai had 105 members in 1963. By 1971, there were 120 members; only 5 of the old members had been dropped, while 20
were added (Smitka 1991, p.85 Smitka 1991, p.85-7) .
What factors account for the differences in turnover rates among associations? One reason appears to be differences in the assemblers' product strategy. In the Japanese automobile industry, it is well known that the implicit supplier contract is for the duration of a model cycle. This implies that the possible occasions for the assembler to switch suppliers, and hence for potential entry and exit of association members, are more numerous the greater the product variety and the shorter the model cycle. Given that the length of the model cycle is more or less the same across assemblers, the greater variety of vehicles manufactured by Mitsubishi Motors, as compared to Toyota, perhaps accounts in part for the higher turnover rate in Mitsubishi's Kashiwakai membership than in Toyota's.
Product or marketing strategy may affect the scope for continuous sourcing in another way.
In particular, a contrast may be drawn between two broad types of marketing. On the one hand, some assemblers, such as Toyota, pursue full-line marketing with an emphasis on the continuum in the spectrum of models from low to high price. On the other hand, other assemblers, such as
Honda and Nissan to an extent, pursue a segmented market strategy with an emphasis on bringing out discrete 'hits' targetted at specific customer groups (Itami et al 1988 chapter 5) . The former can take better advantage of common styling and parts over model cycles as well as across existing models than the latter. Therefore, supplier relationships can be expected to be more continuous at full-line strategy assemblers like Toyota than at segmented strategy assemblers like Honda.
To summarize, there is a considerable variation from association to association with respect to (i) the size of membership, (ii) the proportion of members in the total supplier base, and (iii) turnover of members over time. However, as a common characteristic, association membership is much broader than the boundary of keiretsu groupings, particularly in recent decades when independent suppliers which stand outside the keiretsu have been taking up membership in multiple associations.
Historical Origins and Contemporary Context
The suppliers' association (kyoryokukai) literally translates as a 'cooperation association'.
It is generally a voluntary association with their own rules and regulations. Its aim is generally said to be to enhance member suppliers' cooperation with the assembler and with each other. Most of the suppliers' associations have a name which signifies cooperation, friendship, or prosperity.
Some associations, just like Japanese companies, are described as a 'community of fate' (unmei kyodotai ). Tracing the historical origins and the evolution of suppliers' association assists us in understanding these sentiments.
Historical Evolution
The oldest of the supplier associations is Toyota's Kyohokai which may be traced back to a gathering in 1939 (Kyohokai 1967, p.10) , although a formal association was not launched until 1943. As part of the wartime control regime, the Japanese government at the time imposed a regulation for nominating small and medium sized firms to supply to large firms in order to control industrial production for the war effort. Non-designated firms were left to perish due to lack of funds and materials (Nakamura 1986, p.124-5 The first opportunity to make improvements collectively presented itself in1953, when the prefectural authorities offered a free factory benchmarking service (kojo shindan) to Kyohokai members (Kyohokai 1967, p.24; Wada 1991) . This service was part of the post-war government policy to rationalize and modernize small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Because of large numbers, the Japanese SME Agency chose the keiretsu group (and the industrial district) as units of diagnosis, thus endorsing the existence of suppliers' associations. The public consultancy offered concrete solutions to establishing managerial objectives and production plans, and to improving productivity and quality at each of the supplier firms. Kyohokai members' effort in implementing the solutions bore fruit in the form of the launch of Toyopet Crown in 1955.
Government policy also encouraged SMEs to form themselves into groups in a more explicit manner, through the SME Cooperative Association Law (Chusho Kigyoto Kyodo Kumiai "With a rapid progress in society, every company is facing increasingly tough competition over improvements in product performance and the expansion of production. Our cooperating factories must adapt to both the economic and technological aspects of this situation. As one measure, a policy shall be hereby implemented, which will promote the welfare of every cooperating factory through friendship and mutual help. We intend to promote a higher level of cooperation, and to achieve co-prosperity with Suzuki Motor Company as our parent factory." (Wada 1984, p.88) . Domestic rivalry was thus a significant factor in intensifying the effort poured on association activities.
However, the 1960s presented an added challenge, namely the liberalisation of international trade and capital markets. In anticipation of open trade, Japanese assemblers made a concerted effort to improve quality and cost efficiency. There was widespread fear that if nothing was done, dismantling the protection would severely undermine the domestic automotive industry.
Some suppliers' associations, such as Nissan's Shohokai and Isuzu Kyowakai, were formed specifically to meet this challenge of internationalisation.
To summarize, suppliers' associations spread in the Japanese car industry in three waves.
The first was the years leading up to the Second World War, when the assembler and suppliers 
Suppliers' Association Activities in the 1990s
Today, every association has its own rules and regulations which spell out the bureaucratic machinery that supports the association activities. In the case of Toyota's Tokai Kyohokai, an
Administrative Board, which meets every two months, is in charge of deciding the basic policy of the association, and of drafting a plan of activities for the forthcoming year. Such a plan is approved at the Annual General Meeting (AGM), which is attended by top managers of all member companies. They listen intently to the keynote speech delivered by Toyota's chief executive for clues on Toyota's strategic thinking and future direction. At least a dozen more Toyota managers also attend this AGM. After an award ceremony for best quality or VA.VE suggestions for member suppliers, the day closes with a dinner party. More detailed information on Toyota's purchasing policy, production schedules and sales trends is communicated to member suppliers via the Discussion Meetings (which meets 8 times a year) and an occasional lecture or two by Toyota managers.
The activity plan is implemented by sectoral groups and functional committees. Most of the assembler's associations have this dual structure, although the number of groups and committees vary from association to association. Tokai Kyohokai has three sectors grouped according to the type of parts that members produce. Each group meets once a month, typically to visit a member supplier's factory, and to learn from the member's presentation about problems and achievements at his company the following month. Tokai Kyohokai has three functional committees, on quality, cost, and health and safety. Each meets at least once every two months to study ways of improving the performance of member companies. The committees may conduct a questionnaire survey of members, and write reports and manuals on best practice examples based on members' own experience. The cost committee also organises VE seminars, and the health and safety committee runs technical and safety courses for employees of member companies. Lastly, there are a monthly newsletter, and baseball and golf tournaments for members.
The above organisation structure is well suited to dealing with the staple diet issues of quality, cost, and health and safety. In fact, although slightly different emphases may be put on various aspects of an issue, the themes typically chosen by the suppliers' associations tend to be focused around improving member companies' shopfloor efficiency. This bias is partly because both assemblers and suppliers have felt thus far that gains can be made most by concentrating their efforts on incremental process innovation rather than product innovation. This was dictated by the timing of the Japanese assemblers' entry into the auto industry (Wada 1984, p.97 
What's in it for Assemblers? A Trade-off between Control and Autonomy
The historical overview above noted why suppliers' association associations were started.
Do the same reasons for their founding explain why they persist? What are the incentives of assemblers to continue sponsoring their association? Are there disadvantages, as well as advantages, of having an association from the assembler's viewpoint? Answers to these questions differ again from company to company within the Japanese car industry.
At one extreme, Honda, as mentioned earlier, does not have any association even today.
Honda's late entry into the four wheel business made it possible to free ride on other manufacturers' effort at improving their suppliers. However, late entry does not appear to be a sufficient explanation for the absence of an association, as some assemblers have established their own associations subsequently, Mazda being the most recent case in 1981.
Honda continues not to have its suppliers' association because of a different purchasing philosophy which puts much emphasis on competition and equality of trading. To Honda, a suppliers' association seems too old fashioned and imbued with an undesirable image of top-down control of suppliers. According to a Honda purchasing manager, an association is not necessary as long as there is close bilateral exchange of information (Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun 11 June 1991).
Besides, it has been argued by Honda managers that since a suppliers' association is voluntary, Honda cannot initiate something which suppliers thus far have not demanded.
The other assemblers which have an association continue to retain much control over the activities of the association. For instance, first, the association is typically financed mostly by 
Assessing the Role of Suppliers' Associations: Survey Evidence
Having examined the historical and contemporary functions of suppliers' association from the assembler's viewpoint, this section turns to the analysis of the reasons why Japanese suppliers participate in association activities. In particular, the key questions are:-(i) What do suppliers regard as the most important benefits of belonging to a suppliers' association? In particular, how important is lateral inter-supplier learning as compared to bilateral assembler-supplier linkages?
(ii) How do the benefits of belonging to suppliers' association vary according to the assembler and supplier characteristics?
(iii) What are the performance outcomes of association membership?
The rest of this paper reports on suppliers' views about the above according to the results of a large-scale survey.
Survey Data Description
In July 1993, the author conducted a postal survey of around 1500 automotive parts suppliers in Japan with the sponsorship of MIT's International Motor Vehicle Program. The sample was drawn from a comprehensive list of all first-tier suppliers of components for cars and trucks in Japan (Auto Trade Journal and JAPIA 1993) . Interviews at the purchasing departments of all eleven assemblers and at a few first-tier suppliers preceded the piloting of the questionnaire in Japanese. Japan Auto Parts Industry Association (JAPIA) provided feedback and a covering letter to accompany the questionnaire for its members. Respondents (mostly sales and marketing directors) were asked to answer the survey for a typical product provided to their most important customer; they had a wealth of experience, having worked an average of 22 years at the company.
473 usable responses were received, constituting a 30 per cent response rate.
As shown in Table 5 , 83.9 per cent of the survey respondents are members of the association of the assembler for which the survey was answered. Since the survey did not ask about multiple membership, 'non-members' may be members of other associations. But to the extent that respondents were asked to answer the survey for their most important customer, the member/ non-member distinction should capture a major difference among first-tier suppliers.
Among the non-member respondents, 44% were suppliers to Honda, 27% were suppliers to Toyota and the rest suppliers to other assemblers.
* SEE TABLE 5 *
In this sample, members were not significantly more likely than non-members to be owned by a car assembler. Nor was the number of customers per supplier significantly different between members and non-members. Moreover, the number of other firms supplying the same part to the same customer was actually greater --2.3 companies --for members than for non-members --1.8
companies.
The most significant difference between members and non-members lay in the record of long-term trading with their customer to date: over 50% of the members have traded with the customer for 20 years or longer, as compared to 38% for non-members. Moreover, members' perception of commitment by the customer into the future was much more long-term than nonmembers'. This tallies with the earlier evidence in Section 1 that the membership turnover of suppliers' associations is generally quite low.
Benefits of Membership
The majority of the survey respondents are association members. But there is evidence of a significant variation in the incentives for belonging to a suppliers' association. The questionnaire asked respondents to rank the five most important benefits of belonging to an association. The options given were the five listed in Table 6 , derived from semi-structured interviews with both assemblers and suppliers and the pilot testing of the survey.
* SEE TABLE 6* Dealing with overall averages first, the most popular benefit of belonging to an association was better informational access to the customer. Next, 'learning from other members through exchange of technical information' --lateral inter-supplier learning --was considered the second most important benefit, and more important than the receipt of technical assistance from the customer. Many members apparently regard fellow member suppliers as a more important source of technical know-how than their customer. This lends support to what Fruin and Nishiguchi (1993) call a 'network model' or a 'learning model', in contrast to the bilateral or dualistic model.
These top three reasons were followed by the benefit of receiving stable orders from the customer, and the benefit of being able to monitor the customer's behaviour. The rank ordering of these five reasons remain the same for various sub-samples considered below, but the following distinctions may be noted.
Suppliers were asked in the survey about the process of product development. Those suppliers who jointly developed with their customer or took entire responsibility for design tended to value the first reason --access to information about the customer --more than suppliers whose products were developed by their customer. Thus, the type of customer information which is
valued by members appears to be about design and development for the next model, rather than, for instance, about the certainty of production scheduling. Suppliers were also asked to assess their own technological capability. Those which considered their product design engineering capability to be above average valued access to customer information more than those with average or below average capability.
At the same time, it was the below average design capability suppliers which cited more frequently the second most popular benefit --mutual inter-supplier learning. Moreover, the third benefit, namely the opportunity to receive technical assistance from the customer, was more of a concern for suppliers whose products were developed by their customers than for suppliers which developed on their own or jointly with their customer.
These findings might lead one to expect that suppliers' associations continue to be of greater utility for members with below average technical capability than for those with superior skills. However, that is not the case. In fact, suppliers with superior design capability disagreed more than suppliers with average or inferior skills with both the statements, 'Benefits of association activities have declined recently' and 'Association is no longer central in our dealings with this customer'. This might be because technically superior suppliers are engaged in informal know-how trading among themselves (von Hippel 1987) , while suppliers who have little to offer to others in terms of technical know-how are not getting much useful information from other suppliers. Table 6 shows a clear distinction in the magnitude of benefits between members who feel that the suppliers' association is of declining use and those who do not. As compared to those who saw no decline in the usefulness of suppliers' association, the suppliers which agreed with the statement "Benefits of association activities have declined recently" value both technical assistance and inter-supplier learning less, fear leakage of know-how to other members more, and value the receipt of stable orders from the customer more. Moreover, the function of the suppliers' association as a forum for monitoring whether their customer behaves and acts fairly was more highly rated by suppliers experiencing a decline in the usefulness of the association.
* SEE TABLE 7 * Lastly, the magnitude of benefits differed according to which assembler's association the respondents belonged to. As shown in Table 7 , members of the Toyota association tended to regard the association as still central in their dealings with Toyota, not least because Toyota members perceived greater benefits in technical assistance from the customer than members of other assemblers' associations. It bears out the impression that Toyota's association, with its longstanding history and its concerted effort to diffuse the Toyota Production System, is different both in the magnitude of benefits it brings to its members and the function it fulfills.
Performance Outcomes of Association Membership
The paper began by posing three (not necessarily mutually exclusive) points of view concerning the function of the suppliers' association. The first was an economic theory focus on bilateral contracts which renders suppliers' associations irrelevant (the Bilateral Contracting Case).
A second view was that associations had been useful for improving supplier efficiency in the past but not any longer (the Declining Utility Case). A third perspective regarded suppliers' association as an exclusionary cartel (the Cartel Case).
We would expect the relative economic performance of association members and nonmembers to be different in each of the three perspectives. In the Declining Utility Case, we would expect members to be no different from, or even performing worse than, non-members. In the Cartel Case, we would expect members to be reaping monopoly profit, and possibly better performing in other respects, as compared to non-members. The Bilateral Contracting Case remains silent on this issue.
As shown in Table 8 , the overall picture of the link between membership and performance is mixed. First, pre-tax profitability was lower for members than for non-members. This profitability result refutes a claim that suppliers' associations might be acting like a cartel reaping monopoly profit. Second, members saw a faster growth of sales to the customer than nonmembers. Third, R&D as a percent of sales was lower for members than for non-members. This may be because there are 'network externalities' among members who can achieve high sales growth without R&D spending. This may also indicate that there is a group of suppliers who do not wish to belong to an association as they would do better by appropriating benefits from intense R&D without fear of leakage to competitors. Fourth, members were not significantly better at achieving cost reduction nor in reducing production and delivery batch sizes, according to the survey data.
* SEE TABLE 8* Does performance vary with different incentives for belonging to an association? The only significant distinction was between members which agreed and those which disagreed with the statement that benefits of the association declined recently. Those perceiving a decline in the usefulness of the association experienced slower growth in both sales to the customer and market share, while their costs rose more on average during 1988-92.
Conclusions
This paper presented an analysis of the structure and the functions of suppliers' associations in the Japanese car industry. The underlying set of questions guiding the analysis were: (i) why did the suppliers' associations start; (ii) why do they persist; and (iii) what have been their effects?
The major empirical contribution of the research reported here is in its reliance on the result of a large scale survey of nearly 500 parts suppliers to all the eleven Japanese assemblers. This data has enabled the analysis not only of the structure of the association, but also of the suppliers'
perspectives on the role of these associations. The diversity in their function from association to association is borne out by survey evidence which complements the case studies carried out on Toyota (Wada 1984 ) and on Mitsubishi (Smitka 1991) .
The survey provided evidence that the suppliers' associations continue to exist in Japan not merely out of inertia but because it is serving a useful function in delivering benefits to both the assembler and member suppliers. Those suppliers who found the association of declining utility
were not in the majority, and were less likely among members of Toyota's Kyohokai than among members of other associations. Thus, suppliers' associations are not a historical anachronism.
The survey also shows that suppliers' associations are not cartel-like entities. A combination of lower profits, lower R&D expenditure but higher sales growth of members as compared to non-members calls for an alternative theoretical framework to the cartel theory. The recent application of transaction cost economics and game theory to assembler-supplier relationships in the car industry have contributed much to our understanding of the transactional efficiency of bilateral relationships. However, the survey finding that lateral communication and learning between suppliers in the same association is just as valued by members as technical assistance from the assembler calls for a modification to this bilateral contracting focus in economic theory. That is, supplier relations in the Japanese car industry should be conceptualised not merely as a nexus of bilateral contracts, but as a network of innovators (Freeman 1991) . The latter framework facilitates the examination of the sources of competitiveness of the Japanese car industry not only in terms of relation-specific investment between an assembler and a supplier (Asanuma 1989) , but also in terms of informal know-how 'trading ' (von Hippel 1987) and other types of network-based learning among suppliers. This calls for a more explicit recognition and analysis of externalities to bilateral relationships.
This study indicates that on the whole, the suppliers' association contributes towards enhancing the informational efficiency of the industry-wide network. The core nodes in this network are not so much the assemblers but more the twenty or so major component suppliers which serve several assemblers at once. The suppliers' associations with overlapping membership have helped diffuse innovative practices relatively rapidly within the Japanese automotive sector.
This network for technology diffusion appears to be as important as the close bilateral assemblersupplier relationship in accounting for the overall performance of the Japanese automotive industry. Note: Mean scores of the top 5 statements in order of importance (5=most important; 4=second most important; 3=third most important; 2=fourth most important; 1=least important). Mean score for the bottom 3 statements of (5=strongly agree; 4=agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 2=disagree; 1=strongly disagree). The difference in means between the binary categories in each column (not shown in the table are Col.2: average or below average design capability; Col.3: customer-led product development; Col.4: No decline in benefits of the association) is signifcant at * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%, according to t-test. Pearson's chi-square tests were also performed on the 1-5 scale, which gave similar results of significance. Note: Mean scores of the top 5 statements in order of importance (5=most important; 4=second most important; 3=third most important; 2=fourth most important; 1=least important). Mean score for the bottom 3 statements of (5=strongly agree; 4=agree; 3=neither agree nor disagree; 2=disagree; 1=strongly disagree).
The difference in means between Toyota members and Nissan members (or Mitsubishi members or all except Toyota members) is significant at * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%, according to t-test. 
